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The quality of products supplied by entrants is an important concern in those industries
which have been subject to deregulation. While it is expected that an enhanced competition
will ultimately materialize into lower consumers' prices, it is also hoped that this will not
be detrimental to quality provision. Needless to say, incidents in the US electricity market
(2001 California crisis, 2003 black-out) or UK railways (cf. Reuters news) suggest that quality
might indeed be a concern.1 Anecdotal evidence from the broadband internet access also
suggests that at the early stage, entrants tend to challenge the incumbent, most often the
former monopoly which controls the telecommunication network, by oering lower prices for
services which turn out to be of a lower quality (longer connection delays, limited reliability,
limited technical support).
Quality provision may thus be a concern, even though consumers' high willingness to pay
for quality should be a strong driver for competitive rms to constantly improve quality.
Actually, Sheshinski (1976) has shown that the optimal quality selection by a monopolist
rarely coincides with the ecient one, although the direction in which it departs is not always
clear. In oligopolistic industries, a large literature starting with Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)
has shown the protability of opting for a low quality when facing a high quality incumbent in
order to relax market competition. From the regulator's point of view quality is also desirable
as it reduces the impact of negative externalities (e.g., issues of pollution, safety or health).
Coupled with a paternalistic attitude and the fear of market under-provision, there is a strong
case for stepping-in and imposing Minimum Quality Standards (hereafter MQS).
As nicely demonstrated by Ronnen (1991), the adequate selection of a MQS can increase
both quality and sales so that the industry welfare unambiguously increases. The intuition for
this positive result is quite simple: by constraining the low quality rm to upgrade its quality,
the MQS induces the high quality rm to select a higher quality (in order to relax competition).
In equilibrium, the price competition is however ercer so that prices are lower and more
consumers end up participating. Crampes and Hollander (1995) establish a qualitatively
similar result with a dierent costs structure.
These two papers obviously make a case for MQS but their conclusions might be challenged
on several grounds. Firstly, Ronnen (1991)'s results in favor of imposing a MQS have formal
validity only in a neighborhood of the unregulated level (cf. his theorem 5); the case for a
signicant policy change, the only one that a government may consider, is therefore poorly
1Evidences of the negative eect of deregulation in US Airline markets on the service quality can also be
found in Rhoades and Waguespack (2000).
2supported. Next comes the issue of certication that inevitably goes along with MQS.2 In this
respect, Albano and Lizzeri (2001) show that certication does not go without ineciencies:
although certication intermediaries tend to raise rms' incentives to provide quality, they are
likely to fail in avoiding quality underprovision. Finally, the MQS instrument itself exhibits
several drawbacks. Valletti (2000) shows that Ronnen (1991)'s mechanism is not robust to
the mode of competition: the switch from Bertrand to Cournot type competition destroys the
\good" incentives to increase qualities. Scarpa (1998) shows that the welfare enhancing eect
might critically depend on the duopolistic structure of the industry. Maxwell (1998) puts MQS
in a dynamic perspective and shows that they decrease welfare in the long run because they
weaken incentives to innovate. Lutz et al. (2000) provide a model where rms may manipulate
the selection of the MQS by the regulator in such a way that industry welfare actually decrease.
Glass (2001) reaches similar conclusions in a slightly dierent setup. Interestingly enough,
these cases against MQS are rooted in its most obvious implication: a MQS undermines
industry's protability. As a by-product, imposing a MQS might induce the exit of some
rms, or reduce entry, a problem also acknowledged in Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and
Hollander (1995).3
Building on the mixed appraisal of MQS reported above and, in particular, on the fact
that a MQS might conict with the possibility of entry in deregulated markets, alternative
routes aimed at regulating quality might be explored. Although it is not that pervasive as
a regulation policy, limiting the production capacity of the incumbent seems quite natural
as a tool to invite entry since it ensures the entrant of a protected (though limited) market
share. Actually, the current regulation framework in various European industries allows for
such a regulation. An example is the italian electricity market where a new law prohibits any
generation company from supplying more than one half of the national demand. This measure
was successfully taken to induce entry of competitors to challenge the historical incumbent
(former monopoly). A comparable provision can be found in the European Regulation on
Deregulation of Public Transport whereby the regulator may choose to limit market coverage
of an already dominant rm in order to allow for enough competition. More precisely, Article
9 states that \A competent authority may decide not to award public services contracts to any
operator that already has or would, as a consequence, have more than a quarter of the value
of the relevant market...".4
2Regarding informational issues raised by quality provision in deregulated markets, we refer the reader to
Auriol (1998).
3Notice that this mixed theoretical appraisal of MQS is to some extent conrmed by the (limited) empirical
evidence. See in particular Chipty and Witte (1997) for a detailed empirical study of the eects of MQS on
the quality of child care centers in the US.
4Amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the council on action by member
3There is thus a case where capacity limitation may induce entry in a deregulated market.
In the present paper, we show that such policies also have very nice complementarities regard-
ing the regulation of quality provision. More precisely, we consider a stage game where the
regulator (government) can either set a MQS or limit the output of the high quality incumbent
rm. Then, the potential entrant selects quality and bears some sunk cost to enter; lastly rms
compete in prices. Our (subgame perfect) equilibrium analysis reveals that in order to max-
imize industry welfare, the government should most often prefer the quantitative regulation
over the MQS. The key feature of the quantitative restriction is to relax price competition
so strongly in the last stage, that quality dierentiation becomes purposeless. Accordingly,
the entrant selects a high quality and because the entrant ends up making more prots in
equilibrium, entry remains compatible with quality enhancement for a wider range of entry
cost.
A second contribution of this paper consists in oering some original results regarding the
outcomes of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in markets with dierentiated product. As is
well-known, capacity constrained price competition has been widely studied in markets with
homogeneous goods after the seminal paper of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). By contrast,
very few positive results exist for the case of dierentiated goods.5 In this paper we oer
additonal characterizations of rms' payos for such games which complements the earlier
results of Krishna (1989) and Furth and Kovenock (1993). While these papers deal with
horizontal dierentiation, our paper is the rst one to cast the problem in a setup with vertical
dierentiation. Our results should prove useful for further investigations on the nature of price
competition in markets with capacity constrained rms and dierentiated products.
2 Premices
We consider a regulator R, an incumbent rm i and a potential entrant rm e interacting in
the stage game   of Figure 1 to be analyzed using the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE). The regulator may adopt a \laissez-faire" (LF) attitude or be more active with either
the enforcement of a minimum quality standard (MQS) (over the entrant) or the imposition of
a sales restriction (SR) (over the incumbent). Each possible strategy gives rise to a subgame
where the entrant has to decide whether to enter, and if so, pick a quality level before engaging
into price competition with the incumbent.
states concerning public service requirements and the award of public sector contracts in passenger transport
by rail, road and inland waterway, Ocial Journal of the European Commission, C 151 E/146-183, Article
9-2.




















Figure 1: The stage game  
Section 2.1 presents the details of the model and solves the laisser-faire case. Section 2.2
characterizes the equilibrium under minimum quality standard and derives the preferred MQS
of the regulator. Section 3 then brings the necessary modications to study price competition
under a binding capacity limit. We derive the optimal quality choice of the entrant and his
optimal entry strategy conditional on the government imposed sales restriction (which aects
directly only his competitor the incumbent). After characterizing the preferred quota for the
regulator in section 3.5, we can in section 3.6 compare the three instruments and prove the
claims enunced in the introduction. Section 4 concludes.
2.1 \Laissez-Faire"
The following hypothesis apply for the entire game  . To better focus on the relative merits of
MQS and SR as regulatory instruments, we assume that quality is not costly for rms and that
the marginal cost of production is nil. Secondly, in agreement with most observed real cases,
the incumbent i is committed to the best available quality (normalized to unity)6 so that the
entrant e cannot leapfrog him. In formulas, we set si = 1;Fi = 0;se = s 2 [0;1];Fe = F > 0.
In line with the literature on MQS, we follow Mussa and Rosen (1978) and (Tirole, 1988,
sec. 2.1) to model quality dierentiation. A consumer with personal characteristic x is willing
to pay xs for one unit of quality s and nothing more for additional units. He maximizes
surplus and when indierent between two products, select his purchase randomly. Types are
6An upper bound on the admissible qualities is required to ensure that rms' payos are bounded. We
perform the analysis with the cost of quality k(s) = s
2
K for s 2 [0;1] without notably aecting the qualitative
conclusions of our analysis. The computations are available upon request from the authors. Notice that our
cost assumption amounts to choose K arbitrarily large.
5uniformly distributed in [0;1].
Under \Laissez-Faire" (subgame  0), the challenger decides whether to enter or not, and if
so, chooses her quality s and pays a sunk cost F  0. In the second stage, denoted  0(s), the
two rms sell goods dierentiated by their quality and compete in prices. We study Subgame
Perfect Equilibria of  0. We may characterize demands addressed to the rms as follows:







s if pe  pi   1 + s
pis pe
s(1 s) if pi   1 + s  pe  pis















s  pi  pe + 1   s
0 if pi  pe + 1   s:
(2)





1   pi if pi < pj
1 pi
2 if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj:
(3)
Firms' prots at the last stage of the game are
e(pi;pe) = peDe(pi;pe) and i(pi;pe) = piDi(pi;pe) (4)
The characterization of Nash equilibria in the pricing game  0(s) is fairly straightforward.
Consequently, we limit ourselves to an informal (and mainly graphical) argument. The payos
are continuous and give rise to continuous best response functions illustrated on Figure 2.
Notice in particular that the striped area characterizes the prices constellation for which both
rms enjoy a positive demand.
Accordingly, the rms' best response are




























exhibit kinks when they hit their relevant non-negativity constraint. The unique price equi-





















* pe Monopoly e
pe = pi−1+ s





Figure 2: The price space








The subgame perfect equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the \Laissez-Faire" game  0 is
characterized by Choi and Shin (1992). Practically, the entrant's optimal choice solution of
@e
@s = 0 is s = 4
7, leading to a payo of 1
48 in equilibrium. Accordingly, entry will take place
if only F  1
48: The \Laissez-Faire" analysis is summarized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose quality is not costly and the incumbent sells quality si = 1, then whenever
F  1
48, the entrant enters and optimally dierentiates by selecting quality s = 4
7. The price
equilibrium of the continuation game is unique and in pure strategies.




24 i.e., the incumbent
sells twice as much as the entrant.
2.2 Minimum Quality Standard
In this section, the government commits to a minimum quality standard (MQS) 0  z  1
(since the MQS cannot supersede the best available quality). The continuation game played
by the two rms is denoted  z.
Consider the case where the challenger has entered the market. Obviously, a MQS lower
than the laisser-faire equilibrium level 4
7 leaves the entrant unbothered whereas a greater level
7leads him to stick to the lowest admissible quality level z. Following standard analysis, the












leading to demands Dz
i = 2Dz
e = 2












To characterize the optimal MQS for the regulator, we assume that her objective is to
maximize market welfare and that the enforcement costs of a MQS are nil. Net of the sunk




















12   z   2z2
2(4   z)
2 (9)
where the rst two terms denote the surplus of consumers buying the high and low quality
product respectively. This function is increasing and concave in z.7 Notice that W(z) ranges
from 3
8 to 1
2 over the range [0;1].
Incidentally, W(1) = 1
2 also denes the rst best for this industry, when there are no entry
sunk cost. This quite intuitive result corresponds to the case where all consumers buy the
best available quality at marginal cost (which is zero in the present case). This outcome would
be achieved if there were two rms in the market, competing in price with an homogeneous
product of top quality s = 1: Since rms derive no economic rent in this equilibrium, entry
takes place only if the xed cost for quality F is nil i.e., the long term \free entry" hypothesis
of perfect competition holds. Given that the later hypothesis is untenable, we are forced to
place our study in a second best world.8
The regulator must therefore distinguish whether entry occurs or not as a consequence of
her choice of the MQS z. In absence of entry, the top quality monopoly incumbent serves
half of the market at the monopoly price pM = 1
2 and generates a welfare of 3
8, incidentally
equal to W(0). In case of entry, welfare is W(z) and since this is an increasing function, the
preferred choice of the regulator is the maximal MQS compatible with entry.
There is indeed a tension between a MQS and entry because the higher the MQS, the
closer the two versions of the product, the tougher the price competition and the lower the
7We have W
00(z) =   17z+4
(4 z)4 < 0 < W
0(z) = 20 17z
2(4 z)3.
8We do not consider subsidies to foster entry as they are increasingly fought against by higher order
regulation authorities such as the WTO or the European Commission. Recall that the necessary monetary
transfers involved have distortionary eect on the economy and generate costly information asymmetries
between the government and the candidate rm.
8entrant's prots which are necessary to recoup the entry sunk cost. As a consequence, the
positive entry cost F determines the maximum MQS that can be successfully implemented.
Formally, we may summarize the previous argument in the following Lemma.





; there exists an optimal MQS z(F) that
guarantees entry of the challenger. Both z(F) and W(z(F)) decrease with F.
Proof: The upper bound for the MQS is given by the level z(F) for which an entrant's
prot, net of the entry cost is zero. Solving for z











1 48F(1+F)2 < 0 ,
576(1 + F)2 > 0, this function is decreasing over the domain F 2 [0; 1
48] and since W(:) is
increasing, total welfare is a decreasing function of the sunk cost over [0; 1
48]. 
Corollary 1 When F increases from 0 to 1
48, the duopoly regime prevails; the net surplus
W(z(F))   F is concave decreasing with limit 7
16 ' 0:437. For F > 1
48, the monopoly regime
prevails and welfare drops to 3
8 = 0:375.
3 Sales Restriction
In this section, the regulator imposes a sales restriction q upon the incumbent which denes the
game  q played by rms. Such a sales' restriction or quota can be implemented by controling
rms' production capacities through the limited emission of construction permits or by editing
new regulations.
3.1 Price Competition with a Quantitative Restraint
By denition, the sales quota q denes the largest demand level the incumbent is allowed
to serve. This restriction deeply alters the nature of competition in the pricing game  q(s).
Indeed, whenever prices are such that the demand Di(pi;pe) is greater than q, the incumbent
must turn Di(pi;pe) q consumers away in order to comply with the sales restriction. In other
words, the incumbent rations consumers when demand addressed to him exceeds the quota.
The key implication of the sales restriction is thus to induce Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
at the pricing stage of the game. As is well-known, the organization of rationing in the market
is a critical issue for such games.9 We assume that the ecient rationing rule is at work i.e.,
9See Davidson and Deneckere (1986) for a classical analysis of this last issue.
9whenever Di(pi;pe) > q, rationed consumers are those who exhibit the lowest willingness to
pay for the good.
We now turn to the analysis of the pricing subgames. Two classes of Bertrand-Edgeworth
pricing games have to be distinguished according to the quality selected in the rst stage:
 If s = 1, rms sell homogeneous products in the price game and one of them faces
a quantitative constraint. We shall refer to Levitan and Shubik (1972) for a detailed
analysis of the price equilibrium in these subgames.
 If s < 1, we have a Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing game with product dierentiation. We
present an original characterization of equilibrium payos for such games.10
We start by analyzing subgames where products are dierentiated (s < 1) and then pass
to the case of homogeneous products before concluding with the optimal quality choice by the
entrant.
3.2 Dierentiated Products
We study the pricing game  q(s) for se = s < 1 = si. We divide the price space into a binding
and competitive regime according to whether the sales constraint is active or not. Under
ecient rationing, when a consumer wishes to buy the high quality product but is rationed
by the incumbent, he always prefers to buy the low quality product of the entrant rather than
not consuming. Thus, when at the prevailing prices the demand addressed to the incumbent
exceeds the quota q, all rationed consumers are recovered by the entrant which faces a residual
market 1   q.
Using the demand equation (2), we derive the solution of Di(pe;pi) = q as pi = 
 1(pe) 




Di(pe;pi) if pe  (pi)





De(pe;pi) if pe  (pi)
1   q  
pe
s if pe  (pi)
(11)
Notice, as a preliminary observation, that within the binding domain, the incumbent's
sales are constant so that the optimal price is simply the highest price for which the quota
10Furth and Kovenock (1993) also provide some characterization of equilibrium payos in Bertrand-
Edgeworth games of horizontal product dierentiation with sequential pricing decisions.
10is binding. As for the entrant, he holds a monopoly over a protected market of size 1   q
so that his optimal price is also independent of the incumbent's one. The keypoint then is
to note that the possibility of rationing breaks the concavity of the entrant's prot function
whereas that of the incumbent's remains concave but only over the domain where his demand
is positive (recall from (2) that Di becomes nil for pi > pe + 1   s).
This phenomenon will preclude the existence of pure strategy equilibria in many pricing
subgames. While the existence of mixed strategy equilibria is not an issue here because
of the continuity in payos, the characterization of mixed strategy equilibria in Bertrand-
Edgeworth games with product dierentiation is to a large extent an open problem. To the
best of our knowledge, Krishna (1989) provides the rst characterization of a mixed strategy
equilibrium in a model of symmetric product diernetiation. The structure of the mixed
strategy equilibrium she identies can be used within our setup. It takes the following form:
the entrant will mix over two atoms (the security price and some lower price) while the
incumbent will play a pure strategy. However, in many subgames, this equilibrium does not
exist because a crucial non-negativity constraint is not satised for the incumbent. While we
do not characterize equilibria explicitely, we are able to characterize the entrant's equilibrium
payo for such cases.
The following proposition constitutes the technical contribution of this article to the liter-
ature on Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with product dierentiation.
Proposition 2 Assume s < si = 1, there exists a critical value for the quota  q(s) such that
I if q >  q(s), the \Laissez-Faire" equilibrium prevails.
I if q   q(s), there exists no pure strategy equilibrium and in any mixed strategy equilibirum
the entrant obtains the security payo 1
4s(1   q)2.
Proof We proceed through four steps. Firstly, we derive rms' best reponse. Secondly, we
identify the range in which the \Laissez-Faire" equilibrium analysis still applies. Thirdly, we
characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium where only the entrant rm mixes over two atoms
and characterize the associated payos. Finally, when the quota is tight, the former mixed
strategies equilibrium fails to exist but we are able to prove that in any equilibrium (involving
non-degenerated mixed strategies for the two rms) the entrant nets his the security payo.
Step 1 It is clear from eq. (10) that the best response of the incumbent over the binding regime
is the largest available price 
 1(pe). Using the continuity of payos, itself a consequence of
demand continuity, we note that this optimal price is weakly dominated by the best response
of the competitive (non binding) regime. The candidate best reply in that regime has been
previously characterized as  i(pe) =
pe+1 s
2 , so that whenever this later price belongs to the
11competitive regime, it is the best reply of the incumbent. Formally, we obtain the best response
i(pe) =
(
 i(pe) if pe   pe

 1(pe) if pe   pe
(12)
where  pe  maxf0;(2q 1)(1 s)g solves  i(pe) = 
 1(pe). The best response of the incumbent
is displayed on Figure 4 in dotted bold face; it is continuous with a kink at  pe.11 The non
negativity constraint (NNC) Si = Di = 0 displayed on Figure 4 is dened by equation pi =
pe + 1   s.
In the binding regime, the entrant benets from a monopoly position over a protected
market of size 1 q, his prot is e = (1 q 
pe
se)pe and reaches a maximum of e(q;s) 
s(1 q)2
4
at the security price ps
e 
(1 q)s
2 . In the competitive regime, the best response candidate is the
unregulated candidate  e(pi) =
pis









, pi = (q;s)  (1   q)
p
1   s




e if pi  (q;s)
 e(pi) if pi  (q;s)
(13)
Step 2: Since e(:) is discontinuous at (q;s), the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not
ensured. There are however four pure strategy candidates corresponding to the combinations
\binding" and \competitive" among the two rms.
Firstly, we have the \Laissez-Faire" equilibrium (p
i;p
e) where both rms are in the com-
petitive regime; it is indeed an equilibrium if p





to what is shown on Figure 3).
The second candidate is when the entrant is in the competitive regime while the incumbent
sells at the quota level; it is the intersection of  e(pi) and 
 1(pe) at ^ pi = 2(1 q)1 s
2 s. However
this is not a valid candidate because one can check that ^ pi <  holds true, thus the relevant
branch of the best reply e(pi) is actually ps
e. The other two candidates for a pure strategy
equilibrium are when the horizontal line at ps
e crosses either 
 1(:) or i(:); both can be
dismissed because the jump at  will always occur inside the binding area i.e., before the
intersection.
11The 
 1 line crosses the frontier between duopoly and monopoly for the incumbent at pi = 1   q and
pe = s(1   q) = 2ps
e; for larger pe it becomes a vertical.
















Figure 3: The price space with quota
Step 3: Suppose q <  q(s). As illustrated on Figure 3, there exists no pure strategies equi-
librium. A natural candidate is proposed by Krishna (1989): the incumbent plays the pure
strategy (q;s) and the entrant randomizes over the pair of prices ps
e and  e ((q;s)). By
denition of , the entrant is indierent between ps
e and  e ((q;s)); any mixture over these
two prices yields the same payo. We now compute the weights that make  a best response
for the incumbent.
Let  be the weight on ps
e. When facing ps
e, the sales of rm i are Si = q while they are
Si = 1  
pi  e()
1 s when facing  e(). The expected prot is thus
i = pi

q + (1   )

1  

















































  1 + q
< 1:
Observe that  > 0 , (4   s)(1   q)
p
1   s > 2(1   s) , q <  q(s) which is true in the
present case. A necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is that Di (; e()) > 0;
i.e. the incumbent receives a positive demand for otherwise he would reduce his price to
13get some demand and some prot. Solving this inequality for q, we obtain the restriction





The entrant's equilibrium prot can be computed at any of the prices in the support of
his strategy, for instance at the security price ps
e where his payo is already known to be
e(q;s) 
s(1 q)2
4 (because it is independent of the incumbent's behavior).
Step 4 We show that for q  q(s), in every mixed strategy equilibrium, the entrant earns
e(q;s). Figure 4 depicts a conguration where the non-negativity constraint (NNC) is binding
for the mixed strategy equilibrium candidate identied in Step 3. Recall that the frontier
between the binding and non-binding quota regimes is identied with (:). Best responses














Figure 4: Best responses in prices
We rst show that players supports are quite limited. Observe that, by construction of






be. Hence, e(pe;Fi) =
R
e(pe;pi)dFi(pi), the average over Fi is likewise decreasing over











incumbent's prot is decreasing in own price over [;1], hence the average over Fe is likewise
decreasing over the same range so that the support of Fi is included in [0;]. For pi 2 [0;],






(because he needs not consider the
area on the right of the NNC), hence the average over Fi is likewise decreasing over the same
range so that the support of Fe is included in [0;ps
e]. By the same token the support of Fi is
included in [0;].
Let ~ pe be the supremum of the support of Fe and ~ pi = 
 1(~ pe). We claim that ~ pe = ps
e. If
14not, the previous reasoning applies again telling us that i is decreasing over [~ pi;] for every
pe 2 [0; ~ pe], hence the incumbent does not play prices above ~ pi in equilibrium. Now recall that
in a mixed strategy equilibrium the payo of a player can be computed at any of the prices
belonging to the support of his optimal strategy; let us then consider ~ pe for the entrant. For
any pi 2 [0; ~ pi], the incumbent is constrained by the quota so that the entrant is a monopoly
over a market of size 1   q, hence her optimal behavior is to try to reach the price ps
e. This
stands in contradiction to the fact that ~ pe is the highest optimal price. We have thus proven
that ~ pe = ps
e and as a consequence that the equilibrium payo is e(~ pe;Fi) = s
4(1   q)2 since
the support of Fi is included in [0;]. 
3.3 Homogeneous Products
We analyze here the equilibrium of the pricing subgame where rms sell identical top qualities
(s = 1). In this case, the vertical dierentiation model degenerates into a standard Bertrand-
Edgeworth duopoly over the demand D(p) = 1   p, but with a quantity constraint q for





2 , they show:
Lemma 2 In a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game where si = s = 1, rms play a mixed




















< 1, thus only the
entrant has an atom at the upper price
1 q
2 . In this equilibrium, the incumbent's prot is
i(q) = q(q) since at his lowest price he gets the whole demand 1 (q) thus sells q because
(q) <
1 q
2 < 1 q implies that his capacity constraint is binding. The entrant earns 1
4(1 q)2
because at his highest price, he receives the residual demand 1 q. Notice last that this latter
payo is e(q;1), the limit of the equilibrium payo obtained in Proposition 2 when product
dierentiation tends to zero.
3.4 Optimal Quality Choice for the Entrant
With the help of Proposition 2 and Lemma 2, we may now turn to the selection of the quality
by the entrant given the sales restriction q with the help of Figure 5.






15Proof Over the domain, q >  q(s), where the \Laissez-Faire" equilibrium exists (see Figure
1), the best response in quality is given by the \Laissez-Faire" candidate s = 4
7 (or se = q 1(q)
whenever 4
7 lies outside the relevant domain). Whenever, q   q(s), the price equilibrium is
in mixed strategies and the entrant's payo is e(q;s) =
s(1 q)2
4 , so that the best response is
obviously the top quality s = 1; we refer to this as the \imitation" strategy. To characterize
the SPE of  q, we compare the previous prots. Solving for 1
48 = 
e(4
7) = e(q;1) =
(1 q)2
4 ,
we obtain the cut-o quota q  1   1
2
p









Figure 5: The quota-quality space
3.5 Optimal Sales Restriction for the Regulator
We identify here the welfare maximizing sales restriction. Notice rst that if a regulator's
objective was simply to ensure the provision of the best available quality by both rms, it
would be sucient to impose a sales restriction (SR) at any level q  q (' 71% of the market
size). This level is often binding in the ensuing price game but is not unreasonably restrictive
as it is larger than the equilibrium sales' level of the incumbent in the \Laissez-Faire" case
(' 58%).
Similar to the case of the MQS, a sales restriction might trigger dierent entry and qual-
ity choices from the challenger; two distinct regimes must be analyzed and compared. The
intuition underlying the welfare comparison is nevertheless easy to grab. Over the domain
where the sales restriction induces quality imitation, a looser quota reduces industry prots
as we approach the standard Bertrand equilibrium with zero prots. In other words, a looser
quota generates a ercer competition at the price stage and a greater consumer surplus. Com-
putations show that the gain with consumer surplus dominates the loss with industry prot.
Accordingly, the optimal sales restriction is the loosest compatible with quality imitation.




16Proof: For q  q, we know from Proposition 3 that the entrant chooses the highest quality
and competition takes places in a market for a homogeneous good. In this equilibrium the
incumbent prot is i(q) = q(q) while the entrant obtains e(q) =
(1 q)2
4 . We show in






This function is increasing and concave in q. Since the \Laissez-Faire" welfare is 3
8, a SR
q  q yields a greater welfare and the optimal choice is thus q; the highest quota compatible
with s = 1 in a SPE. Notice that welfare is W(q) ' 0:497. 
3.6 Comparing Sales Restriction and MQS
We can now assess the respective merits of Sales Restrictions and Minimum Quality Standards
in our model of entry with sunk cost. Notice from Propositions 3 and 4 that the entrant's
operating prots are exactly equal to 1
48 at the optimal quota q as in the Laissez-Faire case.
Therefore, the presence of the entry cost F does not constrain the government's possibilities,
as compared to the case of a MQS policy. However, the optimal SR does not yield the rst
best welfare of 1
2 whereas the MQS does at the limit where sunk cost is nil. Formally, we may
state:
Proposition 5 For F > F, a sales restriction induces a higher market welfare than a mini-
mum quality standard.
Proof From Proposition 1, we know that the maximum welfare with a MQS is W(z(F)) F
where W(z(F)) is a decreasing function of F. From Proposition 4, we know that the maximum
welfare with a SR is W(q) F. The cut-o is thus the solution F ' 4:7610 3 of W(z(F)) =
W(q). 
Notice rst that the threshold is less than 1% of the maximum welfare achievable in this
market. The economic intuition underlying our result is straightforward. A sales restriction
relaxes price competition by inducing a less aggressive behaviour of the constrained rm, here
the incumbent. Recall then that in a vertically dierentiated duopoly, one rm selects a low
quality in order to relax competition. However, in the presence of the sales restriction this
is no longer necessary because the sales restriction is a more powerful instrument to reduce
competition. The entrant thus looses any incentive to downgrade quality and both rms end
up selecting a high quality. Moreover, because price competition is less erce, equilibrium
prots for any quality pair tend to be larger. There exists however a limit to the eective level
of the sales restriction. If it is too loose, the entrant enjoys an extremely limited protected
market and therefore prefers to dierentiate optimally. The mechanism at work may therefore
17be summarized as follows: the quota alters the payos in the second stage in such a way that
the entrant's incentive at the rst stage are put in the "right" direction, i.e. quality upgrades.
This MQS mechanism on the other hand, directly constrains the rms' strategy space at
the quality stage. By denition, in order to be eective, the MQS must run against rms'
incentives. By leaving less room for dierentiation, the MQS undermines rms' prots in
equilibrium and therefore impedes entry. As shown in Proposition 5, it is only when the entry
costs are negligible that the government prefers the MQS to a sales restriction. In this case
indeed, the fact that operating prots sharply decrease because of a very high MQS is not a
concern anymore. By contrast, the residual market power that must be left to rms in order
to induce quality upgrades does not depend on F.
4 Conclusion
In vertically dierentiated industries, MQS are often used to control for quality provision.
Within a very simple model, we have shown that sales restrictions might be more ecient
than MQS. Our formal model is quite specic, although it should be stressed that it is quite
in line with the received literature on MQS. Several generalizations can be contemplated.
Firstly, the introduction of positive quality costs that would be sunk before price competition
do not alter our conclusion. Obviously, we do not expect minimal dierentiation anymore.
However, average quality bought by consumers increases and industry welfare increases as
well. Similarly, our results are likely to remain valid if we do not impose any exogenous
quality hierarchy between the entrant and the incumbent.13
A third avenue regards the mode of competition. As we show in the appendix, comparable
conclusions are reached unde Cournot competition as well. All in all, the driver of our result
is robust and is simply the intrinsic ability of quantitative restraints to relax price competi-
tion. In vertically dierentiated industries, this almost immediately implies that rms do not
need to relax competition by dierentiating products. Accordingly, average quality may rise.
Regarding quality selection, the chief merit of the sales restriction is thus quite clear: it gives
to all rms an incentive to select a high quality for their products.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 If quality is not costly and the incumbent sells quality si = 1, then
whenever F  1
48, the entrant enters and optimally dierentiates by selecting quality 4
7. The
13See Boccard and Wauthy (1997) for a more detailed analysis.








s if pe  pi   1 + s
pis pe
s(1 s) if pi   1 + s  pe  pis













s  pi  pe + 1   s
0 if pi  pe + 1   s
(17)
and that prots are e(pi;pe) = peDe(pi;pe) and i(pi;pe) = piDi(pi;pe).
The solution to @ e
@ pe = 0 over the range where both demands are non-negative is  e(pi) 
pis
2  pis; thus, the low quality best response function is e(pi) =  e(pi). In the incumbent
monopoly region (pe > pis), the incumbent's best response is the monopoly price 1
2 which is
feasible if and only if pe > s
2. Otherwise, i is strictly increasing in the monopoly region and






leading to a candidate
best response  i(pe) 
pe+1 s
2 . Whenever pe 
s(1 s)
2 s then  i(pe) 
pe
s meaning that  i is the
best response, otherwise it is the frontier price
pe





























is given by the intersection of  e and  i.








(4 s)2. It is a
matter of calculations to check that e reaches its maximum for s = 4
7. 






Proof The surplus of the consumer with type x 2 [0;1] is best understood by separating 2
cases:
 if x > 1   q, then x > pe because pe 
1 q
2 . The incumbent price pi is the lowest with
probability Fi(pe) in which case the consumer buys at the price pi (because x > pe > pi
and the incumbent is not constrained) so that we need to compute an expectation.
19With complementary probability, the consumer buys at the entrant, thus the surplus of
consumer x is




 if x < 1   q, the consumer is rationed by the incumbent; then either x < pe so that he
does not buy at all, or x > pe and he buys from the entrant deriving a surplus of x pe.
Integrating with respect to the distribution of the entrant's prices, we have three cases
according to the respective positions of x and the upper price limit:
 if x <
1 q


































Integrating with respect to the uniform distribution of consumers over the range of poten-



















simplies is an increasing and concave function. Observe that WC(1) = 1
2, is the market
welfare at the outcome of Bertrand competition between two identical products where no
consumer refrains from buying, all consumers buy the best available quality and rms capture
no rent. The market welfare summing consumer surplus and producers surplus is













We address here the case where rms compete in quantity in the last stage of game. When
the demands (1) and (2) are positive, we have







so that the inverse demands characterizing Cournot competition are given by
pi = 1   qi   qes and pe = (1   qi   qe)s (20)





































e is increasing with s while qc







(4 s)3 > 0, the optimal choice for the low
quality rm is imitation.
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